Zelensky’s Anti-Corruption Missteps: Experts Respond
On July 22, 2025, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky signed Law 12414 following its passage in the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament). This legislation targeted Ukraine’s two most important anti-corruption bodies—the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)—by giving the prosecutor general power over the investigations led by these bodies. In other words, the previously independent NABU and SAPO were brought under the control of the prosecutor general, a position filled by the president.
The swift introduction, reading, and signing of this law set off alarm bells among Ukrainians. For the first time since the full-scale war, people gathered to protest the law and its rapid adoption. In a movement some have called a Cardboard Revolution, participants criticized Zelensky’s consolidation of power, the move away from European standards that these institutions were helping Ukraine achieve, and the growing feeling of distance between elected representatives and average people—those regular citizens who are being mobilized to fight on the front lines.
While Zelensky signed a bill restoring these institutions’ independence on July 31, prosecutors may still be removed by the prosecutor general’s office, a potential curbing of prosecutors’ independence and a challenge to anti-corruption reforms. Furthermore, the scale, effectiveness, and creativity of the protests show that Ukrainians remain deeply engaged in domestic politics, even in the context of war. To shed light on the scale and significance of these protests, TCUP asked two leading experts to provide on-the-ground reports from Kyiv.
Ukraine’s Civil Society Endures
Ukraine’s recent protests may have been brief and appear to be over (for now). But they are important. Not only did protesters quickly secure concessions from the government, which may be crucial in safeguarding Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms, but they also showed us that Ukraine’s civil society is active, engaged, and capable of rapidly mobilizing across the country in response to unpopular government decisions, despite the wartime context. Images of protesters in Kyiv and Lviv have been fairly widespread. But we should also pay attention to the fact that these protests emerged throughout the country, perhaps more quickly than any protests we have seen before in Ukraine, including the 2013-14 Euromaidan.
I have been working to trace protest events across Ukraine, using regional coverage from Suspilne, Ukraine’s public broadcaster, and local news sites. While most protests remained small in size, they were widespread across Ukraine, including towns and cities at high risk of Russian attacks and shelling. This mapping is an ongoing project, and these sources may be underreporting small protests in cities which are not regional capitals. But even with the knowledge that some protests may be underreported, the scope of the protests is impressive.
On July 22, the day that the law undermining the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies was passed, protests were held in at least fifteen towns and cities. These demonstrations spanned Ukraine, from Kharkiv in the east and Odesa in the south, to Sumy in the north and Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk in the west.
By the following evening, public outrage had intensified, and protesters had more time to mobilize. July 23 saw protests in at least 27 locations, including all regional capitals under Ukrainian control, except Kherson, where the absence of protests is likely due to the regular targeted drone attacks on civilians. Gatherings were also held in Bila Tserkva, Kryvyi Rih, Kremenchuk, Drohobych, Mukachevo, and Izmail. This was the largest day of protest, both in terms of the scope of locations and protester numbers. Eighteen cities saw protests of over 100 people, with numbers in excess of one thousand taking to the streets in Kharkiv, Lviv and Kyiv. The next day, slightly fewer protests were reported, and in the evening a new draft law appeared on the Ukrainian Parliament website, in response to public criticism. With President Zelensky seemingly listening to protesters’ demands, the number of demonstrations fell the following day to around 14 cities.
Protests peaked once again on July 30, the night before parliament was due to vote on the improved bill, in order to pressure the government to enact the changes. Protests were held in at least 22 cities, although with success in sight, turnouts were smaller than before. Most of these gatherings, with the exception of Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv, Kharkiv and Ivano-Frankivsk, numbered less than 100 people. The next day, Parliament voted for the new bill, and Zelensky quickly signed it. Protests have since eased, although activists are now closely watching the reforms.
These country-wide protests shared many similarities. Participants gathered peacefully in front of local administrative buildings or on central squares. The flags and symbols of political parties were almost entirely (and deliberately) absent. Instead, people held cardboard signs with slogans written in markers and paint. The slogans stayed firmly on message, calling out the new law against NABU and SAP, and sometimes corruption more broadly. They often employed humor, creativity, and profanities. Young people were an important presence at the protests. The large protest crowds in big cities such as Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv were perhaps even more diverse than those in regional cities, where the youth of protesters was striking. Here, groups of students in their teens and twenties usually led the way, often supported by older women and military veterans. Student networks appear to have played an important role in organizing these regional protests, although in some cities more experienced activists initially led the way. Calls to protest circulated on Instagram via posts and stories and on public Telegram channels, while organization took place in private chats and Telegram groups. Local NGOs, including but not limited to youth organizations, also played a role, particularly in cities with an established local civil society, such as Chernihiv and Lutsk.
We must not forget that these nationwide protests took place in a context of all-out war. Protesters even turned out in cities close to the front lines and at high risk of shelling, such as Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Sumy. Protesters adapted to war-time conditions. In Sumy, for example, organizers encouraged people to leave their protest posters displayed at specific locations around the city, instead of gathering in groups. On more than one occasion, protests were cut short due to air-raid sirens.
The geographic scope of these protests is a testament to the enduring strength of Ukraine’s civil society. Many of the organizers and participants of these protests are activists, volunteers, or those actively engaged in their local community. The strong youth component demonstrates that the generation who were still children at the time of the Euromaidan are now developing their own cohort of civic leaders and activist networks, even though their formative years have been turned upside down by COVID-19 and war. Ukrainians across the country have reminded their government that they are ready and willing to defend Ukraine’s continued democratic development, even as the country faces the existential threat of Russian invasion.
Dr. Emma Mateo is a Mihaychuk Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. A sociologist by training, her research focuses on protest, civil society and political behavior in Ukraine and beyond.
Fighting for Ukraine’s Future on the Rear: A View from the Protests
On the sunny evening of July 23, 2025, in the glitter and luxury of Smart Plaza in Kyiv, I met with a Ukrainian Army officer. We spoke about the heaviness and darkness of the trenches and the pain this war has inflicted on soldiers and civilians. We also spoke about truth, trust, and unity, all eroding because of corruption. Despite the darkness of the trenches, democracy remains one of the core reasons this war is being fought.
That same evening on the streets of Kyiv, protesters chanted “Ukraine is not Russia” and “The front is holding, the rear is falling apart!” Along with protesters across Ukraine, they reasserted Ukraine’s commitment to democracy and stood for the legacy of the Euromaidan revolution of 2014, asking the government to cancel the new Bill No. 12414, passed on July 22.
Several thousands of protesters gathered near Ivan Franko Square and adjacent streets. A truck and a few cars stood, caught in a dense flow of people. The flow of people reached Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the city’s main square, home to the memorial to the Heavenly Hundred (protesters killed during the Euromaidan protests) and the new memorial with hundreds of flags and pictures of soldiers who have died since the 2022 invasion. The majority of protesters were young, a generation whose fathers or brothers have been fighting for Ukraine’s freedom on the front lines. This generation has experienced drone attacks and the cold and stuffiness of bomb shelters. They came of age using profanity to mock the Russian invasion and express their resilience. At these protests, they used this language to speak truth to state authorities: “D*ck for you, not 12414,” “F*ck you, what is it with you,” “F*ck 12414,” “We are f*cked if the voice dies down.” One protestor’s dog carried a sign that read “F*ck, this [corruption] is not happening.”
The protests of July 2025 may go down in history as a Cardboard Revolution. Most people were holding self-made cardboard signs and chanted “Ukraine above all,” “Hands off NABU!,” “Shame!,” “People are power,” “Putin is shit,” “No to dictatorship,” “Glory to the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” “Glory to the Heroes,” “One, only, free Ukraine.” They claimed that “people are giving their lives for our future, and the authorities are destroying it.” Some protestors were creating their cardboard signs on the spot, coming up with their own words, and sharing markers.
The multi-day Cardboard Revolution extended the legacy of Ukraine’s pro-Europe, pro-democracy revolutions. The wartime context made the urgency of truth, trust, and unity all the more poignant. Protesters requested that the government not undermine what Ukrainians have been fighting for—never to become a country like Russia. These protests were a fight for their future on the rear while the front is holding on. President Volodymyr Zelensky introduced a new bill aimed at restoring the independence of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions two days after he signed Bill 12414 into the law, showing that the tenacity of protesters was not in vain.
Dr. Neringa Klumbyte is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Miami University, Ohio. Her current research is based on collecting oral history interviews about everyday life under occupation in Ukraine since 2022.
What lies beneath Ukraine’s “Cardboard Revolution”?
Bill 12414 sparked an unprecedented wave of wartime protests across Ukraine. Under martial law, street rallies are prohibited, so protestors would only take to the streets for a serious problem. So, why have Ukrainians decided they should support the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), two institutions that have been widely criticized as weak and ineffective? The answer requires a deeper look into the Ukrainian political system.
Ukraine became an independent state as the Soviet Union was breaking up, with former communist elites and new democratic movements uniting in favor of independence. Though independence was achieved peacefully, Ukraine paid a high price: the entire Soviet governance structure was carried over into the new democratic and market-oriented state. The side effect of this transition was the continued estrangement between citizens and the state. The citizens of the repressive and punitive Soviet state had learned to keep their heads down if they wanted to improve their chances of survival. As competitive political processes were introduced, voters found mechanisms to keep the largely unaccountable government in check. Unlike in many countries, Ukrainian voters unbundled institutional trust from popularity, making it possible for some political figures to remain popular despite lacking public trust and vice versa.
The last pre-full-scale invasion surveys (end of 2021) revealed four zones of trust: institutions of positive trust (the army, the church, volunteers, civil society, peers), institutions of doubt (the Security Service, the media, the police, local self-governance), institutions of negative trust (the central government, the state in general, the courts, the anti-corruption institutions), and institutions of no trust (primarily Russian institutions). Russia's full-scale invasion of 2022 has shifted the landscape, and trust has risen significantly toward almost all the institutions of Ukrainian society, giving the government leeway to enact necessary reforms. However, the government has been focused on quick fixes and delayed the reforms until after the counter-offensive in fall 2023. In response, the disappointed public began to withdraw the trust it had extended, leaving the government with its usual (limited) capabilities but now with the permanence of a security threat.
After two years, the trust gap between the government and civil society has widened in favor of the latter, shifting the balance of influence over the national agenda. Criticism of the government has grown in civil society regarding democratic backsliding, military command decisions, mobilization policies and implementation practices, media oversight, treatment of prominent activists and weak regulation of corrupt business dealings.
At the same time, Parliament has passed many reformist laws, which were in contradiction to the political interests of the ruling parties, including President Zelensky's Servant of the People party. This legislation, along with the independence of NABU and SAPO, was a significant part of EU integration conditionality. And, since EU integration enjoys massive popular support, the political coalition had been inching toward reforms. However, the pain caused to the elites by NABU and SAPO appeared to cross a threshold. Not only did Parliament vote with a confident majority to dismantle the independence of these institutions, the president, notorious for delaying signatures, signed it the same day, despite warnings from both civil society actors and EU leaders.
Civil society has been both generally supportive of the purpose and critical of the performance of NABU and SAPO. The public could see little progress with high-level corruption, which likely contributed to the political calculus that the attack on anti-corruption institutions would fly under the radar of public opinion. However, this was interpreted by civil society leaders as a dangerous precedent of disrupting key institutions, and the public protests followed. Once protests spread across Ukraine, from Zakarpattia to Donbas, and the EU took a hard stance, it became evident to the Zelensky administration that a line had been crossed. Unlike President Kuchma, who had a similar record of aligning with civil society on national security issues and being at odds on democratic governance issues, and rarely changed course, Zelensky reversed his position almost instantly, once it became clear that the protesters would not back down.
The protests in Ukraine demonstrated that despite the absence of elections during wartime, the democratic process is alive. They have also shown the growing sophistication of voter motivations. The Cardboard Revolution, as it is referred to in the press, is likely to have long-term significance for Ukraine's political landscape. It has also empowered a new generation of voters, who in many cases have not been able to vote yet, but have learned to make their voice heard.
Yevhen Hlibovytsky is a Ukrainian public intellectual who has been active in the debate on Ukraine's long-term development and its impact on the rest of the world. He is a founding partner of the Frontier Institute, a supervisory board member of Suspilne (the Ukrainian Public Broadcasting Service) and an advisory board member of Razom for Ukraine, a US-based advocacy group.