Strengthening the Eastern Flank
How U.S. Involvement in the Poland-Ukraine LNG Corridor Can Bolster Eastern Europe’s Gas Market
As Western leaders search for paths to ensure a just and sustainable peace in Ukraine, U.S. foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe’s energy system, combined with energy sanctions on Russia, can pressure Putin’s Kremlin to end its aggression.
Since assuming office, President Trump has made it clear that he wants to push his team to deliver a “peace deal” for Ukraine as quickly as possible. While the Trump Administration’s approach thus far has largely been focused on pushing Ukraine to accede to a fast ceasefire deal through tools of security and economic pressure (e.g. a security-guarantees-free “critical minerals deal”), Trump has also recently spoken of levying sanctions and tariffs on the Russian Federation given the Kremlin’s continued nightly kinetic strikes against Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure.
While tariffs hardly would factor into Putin’s calculus—there is only an extremely small amount of bilateral trade between the United States and the Russian Federation, reportedly at a two-decade low—the general policy trajectory suggested here is sound with regard to sanctions. Especially in the past several days, which saw Ukraine agree to a U.S. proposal of a 30-day ceasefire, only to see Putin’s de-facto rejection of the offer, it's time for the United States to step up all measures to force the Kremlin to end its onslaught of aggression on its democratic neighbor.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can only be brought closer to an end through a sharply increased maximum pressure campaign to curtail the Kremlin’s energy export revenues, which serve as a key economic lifeline to sustain Russia’s military atrocities. Significantly tougher sanctions and technology export controls on Russia’s industries (crude oil, natural gas, and further blocking of oil field service technologies) needs to be an urgent priority for the Trump Administration, and Trump himself should follow through with as quickly as possible.
Reducing Russian gas exports via strategic energy policy changes and investment means could amplify the impact of stronger U.S. energy sanctions. Notably, Ukraine took the bold step of ceasing the transit of Russian gas to Europe starting on January 1, 2025, effectively denying Russia an estimated 6.5 billion USD in annual gas revenues. This decision was made despite intense pressure from several pro-Russian governments within the EU—most notably from Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico, who strongly advocated for continuing Russian gas transit via Ukraine. He even threatened to reduce electricity supplies to Ukraine (already facing constant Russian energy infrastructure attacks) and to withdraw social support for Ukrainian refugees in Slovakia.
By ending Russian gas transit, Ukraine is set to cut Russian deliveries by approximately 15 billion cubic meters per year. This forces the EU—particularly Central and Eastern European countries that have historically depended on Russian gas—to seek alternative suppliers. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) presents the most viable alternative, creating fresh opportunities for U.S. producers, who have already become Europe’s largest LNG suppliers and key players in ensuring the continent’s energy security. However, many nations in Central and Eastern Europe still lack sufficient access to LNG terminals.
To address these infrastructural constraints, several Eastern European gas Transmission System Operators (TSOs)—including DESFA and Gastrade (Greece), ICGB and BULGARTRANSGAZ (Bulgaria), TRANSGAZ (Romania), FGSZ (Hungary), EUSTREAM (Slovakia), VMTG (Moldova), and GTSOU (Ukraine)—have proposed developing a “Vertical Corridor” to link Central and Eastern Europe with LNG terminals in Southern Europe. While promising, the European Commission must keep a close watch to ensure this route does not become a backdoor for Russian gas to re-enter Europe via Turkey.
At the same time, Eastern and Central Europe need an additional viable LNG route. One especially promising solution is a Poland-Ukraine corridor, leveraging existing LNG facilities in Poland and the Baltic region, Ukraine’s extensive gas storage, and strong transmission links connecting Ukraine to Eastern European markets.
Poland already possesses several key facilities that could anchor such a corridor. The Świnoujście LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea has been operational for years and is steadily expanding its regasification capacity. Plans for a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) near Gdańsk will further boost Poland’s ability to handle large LNG cargoes. These facilities, combined with the Gas-Interconnector Poland Lithuania (GIPL) pipeline connecting Poland to the Baltic states’ LNG terminals, offer unique potential for supplying Eastern European markets with non-Russian gas.
Ukraine, for its part, already has significant transmission capacity at its border with Poland. Two high-pressure pipelines can manage up to 6.6 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Poland, transporting it via Ukraine’s robust gas transmission system to neighboring Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, and Romania—and even further south through the Trans-Balkan pipeline. Ukraine’s underground storage, the largest in Europe at 31 bcm, adds valuable flexibility to the route by helping balance seasonal demand.
Beyond meeting Ukraine’s own demand for imported gas, this corridor would also provide Central and Eastern European countries with an alternative to the proposed “Vertical Corridor.” Still, additional upgrades are needed in Poland’s domestic pipeline network to accommodate higher flows. These improvements include adding a compressor station and constructing several new pipeline segments within Polish territory. While the technical aspects of these connections are well understood, attracting the necessary financing remains the main challenge.
Ukraine and Poland have discussed such plans for at least five years, but the main obstacle has been ensuring the project’s financial viability. Unfortunately, the typical financing model—signing long-term capacity bookings—was unsuccessful. Recent market-based assessments by Polish and Ukrainian operators failed to secure any binding, long-term commitments from traders. Energy companies, wary of market volatility and regulatory uncertainty, often hesitate to sign multi-year deals. This shortfall highlights a gap between the political goal of reducing Russia’s regional energy position and the commercial realities encountered by infrastructure developers. As a result, a new financing framework is essential, given the project’s strategic importance for the entire Eastern flank.
The United States, as one of the world’s top LNG exporters, has a vested interest in increasing its footprint in Europe. It also has a geopolitical motive to curb Russia’s influence by supporting alternative gas supply pathways. If framed as a U.S.-EU trade deal and championed by Poland (Trump’s apparent best friend in the EU), the White House may be inclined to support the development of a Poland-Ukraine LNG corridor.
Establishing a resilient LNG corridor from Poland to Ukraine would greatly reduce Eastern Europe’s dependence on Russian energy. This northern route would provide CEE countries with instant access to global LNG markets, in addition to the proposed southern “Vertical Corridor.” Built around existing terminals and pipelines, the corridor could become the cornerstone of a broader regional energy strategy—one that recognizes the political dimensions of energy supply while maintaining commercial viability.
Ultimately, the success of this initiative depends on overcoming funding and infrastructure hurdles that have persistently delayed progress. The technology needed is already available, and viable routes have been identified, but a coordinated cooperation framework involving Brussels, Washington, Warsaw, and Kyiv remains elusive.
With strong U.S. involvement and commitment from Poland, Ukraine, and their European partners, the Poland–Ukraine LNG corridor could become a cornerstone of energy security across Central and Eastern Europe—weakening Russia’s grip on the region while adapting to shifting global energy dynamics.
This combination of sanctions and gas infrastructure development will ensure only one loser at the negotiating table: Vladimir Putin.
