TEMERTY CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE PROGRAM
UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

REFUGEES FROM UKRAINE IN POLAND: FROM RECEPTION TO INTEGRATION

Jolanta Szymańska
Head, European Union Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs

TCUP REPORT

Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program
Ukrainian Research Institute
Harvard University

TCUP Report: Refugees from Ukraine in Poland: From Reception to Integration

Refugees from Ukraine in Poland

Russia's full-scale invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine that began in 2022 caused a massive humanitarian crisis and led to one of the biggest refugee crises globally. The scale and dynamics of the refugee movement are unprecedented in 21st-century Europe and the largest since the end of World War II. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, in the first year of the invasion, more than 8 million Ukrainians left the country seeking protection in Europe. For most of them, Poland became the first country where they could find a safe haven.

The massive influx of war refugees was a challenge for Poland and other frontline countries in Central Europe, which have little experience in accepting refugees and were not systemically prepared for it. Poland's situation was the most complicated because in addition to the massive displacement of people from Ukraine, since mid-2021 the country has been confronted with the instrumentalization of migration by the Belarusian regime,[1] which resulted in a crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border.

The aim of this paper is to present and assess the policy response of Poland to the mass influx of Ukrainian refugees. It also analyzes the situation of war refugees in Poland, with special emphasis on their labor market inclusion. It has become clear that the war in Ukraine will continue for longer and the refugees' stay in Poland will be prolonged. This paper explores the potential of refugee integration in Poland and the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Poland's broader migration policy.

Large-Scale Refugee Movement to Poland

Poland's migration landscape began to change intensively several years before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. After 2014, when war broke out in the eastern part of Ukraine, Poland openly welcomed Ukrainians. The total number of Ukrainian nationals residing in Poland before 2022 was estimated at about 1.35 million people (based on Central Statistical Office data).[2]

While Ukrainians constituted the largest group of migrants in the country, they rarely sought asylum, most commonly using pathways facilitating economic migration, especially the simplified procedure for employing a foreigner (dedicated to citizens of six Eastern European Partner countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia).[3] This procedure was introduced to

a large extent in response to the problems of a shortage of workers on the domestic labor market. It "made Poland one of the most liberal regimes in terms of the employment of foreigners (additionally, being a fast-growing recruitment sector also contributed to the increase in the scale of labor migration)".[4] Most of the Ukrainian migrants were economically active; according to estimates, 95% of adult Ukrainian migrants in Poland before 2022 were employed.[5]

The situation changed rapidly in February 2022 when, in just the first two weeks after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one million people from Ukraine crossed the Polish border in search of humanitarian protection. Since mid-March 2022, the dynamics of arrivals from Ukraine to Poland gradually began to change, slowing from the initial influx. At the same time, an increasing number of Ukrainians were returning to Ukraine despite the ongoing war. Among them were people who had lived in Poland before the war and were returning to Ukraine to join the army, comprising an estimated 50,000–60,000 people since the invasion until mid-May 2022.[6]

In autumn 2022, Russia intensified its bombardment of critical energy infrastructure in Ukraine through the winter months, triggering another wave of refugees. Despite these efforts, traffic on the Polish-Ukrainian border stabilized (see figure 1 below). By the end of 2022, a total of around nine million border crossings from Ukraine to Poland were registered by the Polish Border Guard. Since many Ukrainians crossed the border numerous times, the border crossings statistic does not reflect the actual number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland. The Polish Border Guard estimates that in 2022 about four million refugees from Ukraine arrived in Poland. About one million remained in the country and registered for temporary protection in Poland under a special act on assistance for refugees from Ukraine.[7]

Most of the Ukrainian refugees who decided to stay in Poland were women and children. According to an EWL survey,[8] they mainly came from northern Ukraine, a region where the Russian attack was repelled but which experienced massive destruction. Due to the availability of housing and the situation on the labor market as well as wide access to public services (important for children of preschool and school age), around 70% of refugees from Ukraine settled in the twelve largest cities of Poland.[9]

Figure 1. Number of People Crossing the Poland-Ukraine Border.



Source: Polish Border Guard.

Poland's Response to the Refugee Crisis

The shock related to the escalation of the war in Ukraine in 2022 triggered huge solidarity with Ukrainians fleeing the country, leading to the spontaneous involvement of Polish society in welcoming the refugees in Poland. Especially in the early days of the crisis when no international aid organizations were yet operating and the Polish government was still preparing support programs and policies, much of the work of addressing the needs of war refugees was shouldered by private citizens.

At the beginning of the crisis, the social acceptance for taking in and supporting refugees from Ukraine was very high. In Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) surveys from March and April 2022, more than 90% of Polish citizens supported hosting refugees from Ukraine in Poland, with only a few declaring the opposite view (see figure 2 below).

Within the first three months after the invasion, over 70% of Polish citizens stated they had provided support for refugees. Support took various forms: in a Polish Economic Institute survey, 59% of Poles declared material assistance (buying and donating products), with slightly fewer (53%) making cash payments. Other forms of assistance included supporting refugees in sorting out various issues (20%) or volunteering to assist them (17%), while 7% of respondents made an apartment or house available to refugees, and 5% offered transport (including to/from the border).[10]

Businesses played an important role, cooperating with non-government organizations (NGOs) on a large scale for the first time. According to the Polish Economic Institute and Polish development bank, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), 53% of Polish enterprises were involved in helping Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees who came to Poland, according to research conducted in May 2022. Companies organized collections of food, clothing, and medical products, delivering them to points offering help for refugees. Other forms of assistance included providing services or products free of charge, such as transportation companies offering free transport from the border, private healthcare companies giving urgent free medical assistance, and banks removing fees for money transfers to Ukraine.

Social media, especially Facebook, turned out to be an important tool in the organization and coordination of

Figure 2. Public Support for Accepting War Refugees from Ukraine in Poland (%).



Source: CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre, CBOSNews 2023/14.

Poles' grassroots help for refugees from Ukraine. These platforms enabled a very rapid exchange of information about the most urgent needs and possibilities for supporting refugees. The NGOs Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), the Polish Centre for International Aid (PCMP), and the Polish Migration Forum, as well as many other groups, played crucial roles. For example, in the first months of the invasion, PAH focused its activity on the Polish-Ukrainian border, running relief points for refugees in Dorohusk, Zosin, and Hrebenne. PCMP, in cooperation with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the city of Warsaw, opened a 24-hour Transit Center for refugees at the East Warsaw Railway Station. It also established a Medical Transit Center for patients from Ukraine next to the airport in Jasionka, near Rzeszow. The Polish Migration Forum launched the Assistance Center "Plicz-o-Plicz" (Shoulder to Shoulder) in Warsaw. The networks and involvement of the Ukrainian community already living in Poland, including people with migration experience and the Ukrainian national minority, also proved helpful.[11] For instance, the Warsaw-based Ukrainian House (Ukraiński Dom) collected funds for humanitarian aid and provided job and accommodation offers to Ukrainian refugees.

In the first weeks after the invasion, the activities of the Polish government focused on creating legal and institutional standards for refugees from Ukraine, enabling their reception and determining the conditions of their legal stay in Poland. On the first day of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the government decided to open additional reception centers at border crossings with Ukraine, where arriving persons could obtain information, basic medical assistance, and material support (including food). In early 2022, Paweł Szefernaker, Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, was appointed the Government Plenipotentiary for War Refugees from Ukraine. His task was to coordinate the work of different ministries in providing assistance to refugees from Ukraine. In the middle of March 2022, the government adopted a special law[12] allowing Ukrainians who had crossed the Ukrainian-Polish border since the beginning of the invasion legal access to the labor market, medical care, and family and child benefits for up to 18 months. The rights guaranteed by the special act were conditioned on registration in the Electronic System for Registration of the Population, PESEL. Refugees registering in the system obtained the status of "PESEL UKR" and an electronic document via Diia.pl.

Due to a need to clarify the regulations and adapt them according to the development of the migration situation, the special act on assistance to refugees from Ukraine was amended many times after its adoption in March. The most important of these were three changes introduced in 2022: extending the rights guaranteed by the special act to Ukrainians who came to Poland from the territory of other states; facilitating the right to practice for non-EU doctors wishing to help refugees; and extending the period of payment of benefits for Poles hosting Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war. The beginning of 2023 brought another, more controversial, amendment to the act. Adopted on 13 January 2023, refugees placed in collective accommodation centers were obliged to cover 50% of the costs of their stay. Despite warnings from non-governmental organizations about the impoverishment of refugees, the government argued that the changes were necessary to reduce the costs incurred by Polish taxpayers and support the professional activities of refugees.

After fulfilling the tasks related to the first phase of the refugee reception, the Polish authorities, in cooperation with NGOs, began to look for systemic solutions to meet the challenge of refugees' longer-term presence in Poland. In January 2023, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister inaugurated the program "Mutually Needed," which was aimed at reducing the effects of the social and housing crisis related to the mass influx of refugees to Poland. Projects aimed at effective mediation of medium- and long-term assistance and social inclusion, and projects intended to satisfy needs in the area of housing, the labor market, and education, will be selected by the end of 2023.[13]

EU Support

Although the existence of the visa-free travel policy between the EU and Ukraine enabled citizens with a biometric passport to move freely within the territory of the European Union for up to 90 days (and allowed Ukrainians to apply for asylum in a Member State after reaching its territory), after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, the EU decided to implement special measures facilitating the reception of refugees from Ukraine across Europe. To speed up the procedure for granting protection, the EU activated the 2001 Directive on Temporary Protection for the first time in its history at the beginning of March 2022.[14] The decision,[15] adopted unanimously by the EU Council, provided immediate and collective protection of all displaced persons who had left Ukraine from 24 February 2022 (both Ukrainian citizens and stateless

persons and third-country nationals who benefited from international or national protection in Ukraine, as well as their family members). Rights under the temporary protection scheme include a residence permit, access to the labor market, access to accommodation and housing, health and social care, and education.

The activation of the directive was a signal to the refugees from Ukraine that they were welcome on the territory of the entire European Community. It provided an impetus for the bottom-up relocation of refugees within the EU and accelerated the delivery of assistance, avoiding overloading frontline countries' asylum systems. To facilitate implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive, the European Commission coordinated cooperation and the exchange of information between EU countries to monitor their capacity to receive refugees and to identify the need for additional support in implementing the directive. Many transportation companies in the EU established additional connections and offered free transport by train, bus, ship and plane. As a result, refugees spread across Europe, benefiting from temporary protection status in many member states. According to Eurostat statistics, from 31 March 2023 the main EU member states hosting beneficiaries of temporary protection were Germany (1,067,755 people; 27% of the total), Poland (976,575; 25%) and Czechia (325,245; 8%). Many others have benefited from temporary protection in Spain (165,415), Bulgaria (151,590), and Italy (148,060).[16]

In addition to the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, at the beginning of March 2022 EU institutions adopted exceptional changes to the 2014–2020 EU budget, allowing member states to use a range of assistance available under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, Cohesion Policy, and the Home Affairs funds to cover the needs of people displaced by the Russian invasion.[17] The Commission identified around €17 billion (over $18 billion) in funds for cohesion and post-pandemic recovery that EU countries could reallocate to support housing, education, healthcare, and other refugee needs. Additionally, in April 2022, the EU Council adopted a regulation allowing member states and other donors to make contributions under the 2021–2027 Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund. EU institutions were also very active in organizing conferences and coordinating donor initiatives for Ukraine. For example, at the invitation of the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, the world donors' conference "Stand Up For Ukraine" was held in April 2022, during which participants declared around €10 billion ($10.7 billion) of support for Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees.[18]

According to a European Commission report, by May 2023, 18 out of 27 EU countries had amended their European Social Fund 2014–2020 programs, either by adding a new priority to support people fleeing Ukraine or by including explicit additional priorities under the existing ones. For example, in Poland the European Social Fund helped to set up regional Integration Centers for Migrants, which offer integration and language courses, support in finding a job, and recognition of diplomas.[19]

To support the member states in refugee integration, the European Commission published a recommendation on the recognition of academic and professional qualifications of refugees and issued guidelines to facilitate refugees' access to employment in the EU. The Commission and the European Labour Authority set up the EU Talent Pool pilot program to facilitate matching refugees from Ukraine with suitable jobs through the European Cooperation Network of Employent Services (EURES).

Integration: State of Play

On the one hand, the shortage of workers in the labor market in Poland created favorable conditions for the integration of Ukrainian refugees (according to Eurostat data, in December 2021 the unemployment rate in Poland was only 2.9%).[20] This market, which had been struggling for years with a shortage of native workers (due to emigration of many Poles to other EU countries after the country's accession to the EU in 2004, as well as to an aging society), was confronted with a decline in migration caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. On the other hand, the structure of migration from Ukraine after February 2022—mainly women with little or no related experience—did not perfectly match Poland's market needs where industrial workers, construction workers, traders, and IT workers were most often sought after.

Despite the mismatch between the qualifications of the refugees and the labor market's needs, most of the adult refugees from Ukraine found employment in Poland. According to a central bank (Narodowy Bank Polski, NBP) report in November 2022, the percentage of refugees working in Poland was 65%.[21] The latest survey by the Foundation for the Support of Migrants on the Labour Market EWL and the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw showed that the percentage

of employment of war refugees in March 2023 was 71%, compared to 83% among prewar migrants from Ukraine.[22]

The mismatch between the qualifications needed and work being performed is already evident. According to the NBP report, a large share of refugees from Ukraine provide services for households, very often on the basis of temporary contracts. More than half of the refugees from Ukraine in Poland declare that their work does not match their acquired qualifications. Many of them have a university degree or incomplete higher education (48% in the NBP survey[23] and 69% in the EWL study[24]). At the same time, their knowledge of the Polish language, although improving, is still not good enough to find a job in their profession. In the EWL survey, only 4% of war refugees declared fluency in the Polish language, 10% stated they had good command of it, 46% reported average skill, 35% bad, and 5% very bad. As figure 3 (below) shows, the main problems indicated by the citizens of Ukraine working in Poland are the high expectations of Polish employers (37%) and limited mobility (28%).

There has been a significant mismatch between employment and services and housing availability for refugees in Poland and thus their housing situation still leaves much to be desired.[25] According to an Amnesty International report, about 200,000 apartments can currently be rented by refugees from Ukraine on market terms, mainly in large cities in Poland such as Warsaw and Kraków. However, in some communities there is already a shortage of rental housing and the prices of apartments have been rising. In 2022, rental prices of apartments in Warsaw, the largest city in Poland with a population of 1.863 million, increased by 18% in the fourth quarter compared to the previous year. The highest price increase was recorded in Kraków and Łódź—19%. The year 2023 saw another increase in rental prices and housing maintenance costs. The costs of renting and maintaining an apartment are beyond the capabilities of many refugees. According to the 2023 Amnesty International report, an additional problem is the reluctance of Polish people to rent apartments to refugees. The reason is often the belief that in the case of non-payment of rent, for example, refugees will not be able to be evicted. As a result, more than a year after the

Figure 3. Main Obstacles for Refugees from Ukraine Seeking a Job in Poland (%).



Source: "Report on cross-border mobility 'Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish labour market. New challenges and perspectives.'" Report from the 4th edition of the sociological study "Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish Labour Market" conducted by the Foundation for the Support of Migrants on the Labour Market EWL and the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2023, https://ewl.com.pl/.

Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are still many refugees staying in collective accommodation centers, especially in large cities, despite their temporary nature.[26]

According to a survey by the Foundation for the Support of Migrants on the Labour Market EWL and the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw,[27] Ukrainian refugees are not attached to living in urban areas, although at present they mostly reside in cities. A significant proportion (44%) are ready to move to smaller towns in Poland if provided with work and adequate conditions for the whole family.

Refugees from Ukraine are increasingly using public services in Poland. For example, the EWL study shows that 55% of the refugees from Ukraine already use state healthcare facilities in Poland, with only 9% declaring that they do not use it at all, 6% of refugees declaring that in case of health problems they go to Ukraine, and 29% saying that they consult a doctor in Ukraine by phone. In education, 32% of Ukrainian refugees in Poland indicated that their children benefit exclusively from the Polish education system, 34% from both Polish and Ukrainian, and 32% declared only the Ukrainian one.[28]

Data on the integration of refugees, especially into the labor market, have so far had a positive impact on their perception in Polish society (see figure 4 below). Even though social acceptance for taking in and supporting refugees from Ukraine remains high, it is decreasing over time (see figure 2 on p. 5). This "solidarity fatigue" is partly related to economic conditions; although the situation concerning the labor market remains very good—according to Eurostat in 2023, Poland still has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU at 2.8%)—the cost-of-living crisis has hit low- and medium-income families. While in public opinion surveys most Poles do not blame Ukrainians for the deterioration of the economic situation in the country or in their households, and they see no problem with living next to refugees or their presence in public spaces or working in Polish companies and public institutions, some Poles declare that they have

Figure 4. Public Opinion about Refugees from Ukraine in Poland.



Source: "Polacy i Ukraińcy – wyzwania integracji uchodźców," Polish Economic Institute Report, Warsaw, April 2023, https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Wyzwania-integracji-.pdf.

heard unfavorable opinions about refugees from Ukraine, most often from their friends or in workplaces. These opinions mainly concern claims of abuse of privileges by refugees and their demanding attitudes.

A study of the Polish-language internet confirms the existence of "anti-Ukrainian" discourses on social media. They take different forms, with probably the most well-known and most widely described being historical threads (references to the difficult history of Polish-Ukrainian relations), ethnic threads (popularization of the hashtag #StopUkrainizacjiPolski [Eng. "Stop Ukrainization of Poland"]), and economic threads (focusing on the alleged privileges of refugees from Ukraine, as well as on the "weakness" of the Polish state). Increases in instances of anti-Ukrainian discourse are usually associated with controversial events—from the point of view of public opinion—that are promoted by politicians, especially from the far right.[29]

Conclusions and Recommendations

The mass exodus of refugees that occurred as a result of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 posed a major challenge to the Polish government and society. Despite the initial shock and chaos characteristic of any response to a crisis, in a short period Poland passed the test of providing aid and migration management. Polish society, which actively engaged in providing help on many levels, was a large part of this success. EU support, especially the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, which stimulated the bottom-up relocation of refugees to other European countries, was also significant.

The transition from the reception phase to the integration phase of refugees and the inclusion of these activities in a broader migration strategy remains a challenge for Poland. Although refugees from Ukraine have access to the Polish labor market, healthcare, housing market, and the education system, there is still work to be done to remove obstacles and barriers to the use of institutionally open opportunities. The latest amendment to the special law on assistance for refugees from Ukraine, which was supposed to encourage them to find housing outside collective accommodation centers, conflicts with the problems of shortages in the housing market, especially in the largest cities. To address the challenge, Habitat for Humanity recommends the better use of available EU funding by the government to expand affordable housing solutions for refugees; e.g., the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) could be used to finance rent-supplement measures and develop service provision, and the Cohesion Fund could be spent for the renovation of unused building stock and the construction of municipal and nonprofit housing for refugees.[30]

The strength of the Polish labor market allowed Ukrainian refugees to quickly become professionally active. While the government (in cooperation with NGOs and other partners) stepped up its efforts to increase the availability of language training and improve procedures for recognizing refugees' qualifications, further progress in this area is needed. Wider use of EU tools (e.g. Massive Open Online Courses and Free Digital Learning) and funds can contribute to progress in this area. Due to the profile of the refugees, improving access to childcare, especially childhood education and care, can also positively influence an increase in the economic activity of displaced persons. A constant challenge is to improve the Public Employment Service so that it can effectively assist the job-search process. These proactive measures may facilitate the integration of refugees and more effectively unlock their potential for the needs of the Polish economy.

Considering the large share of temporary contracts among refugees, however, it is important to prevent fraudulent work and the risk of mistreatment. As the issue of Ukrainian worker exploitation in Poland is not new in Poland, the stronger regulations and improved enforcement to safeguard migrant workers' rights is needed.

Although refugees from Ukraine are still positively perceived in Polish society, it is necessary to monitor the scale of the assessments and discriminatory behavior in the host society and the spread of disinformation and hate speech against refugees on social media. The protracted conflict and deteriorating economic situation in Europe create conditions for the spread of Russian propaganda, which may further weaken public support for receiving and assisting refugees and lead to tensions between refugees and the host society. In this context, it is worth extending integration activities to other, noneconomic areas, including social and cultural spheres.

At the same time, the experience of the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the labor market in Poland should be used in relation to other groups of refugees in Poland (and other EU countries), for example through a wider

opening of national markets to them. Currently, under Polish regulations, asylum-seekers from other regions cannot take up employment for the first six months of the asylum process. They have the right to do so only when they are covered by international protection or if the process is prolonged, and when it takes more than half a year and is not the fault of the seeker. Lessons learned from Poland's response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine can help amend policy toward all refugees.

Notes

1 A. M. Dyner, "The border crisis as an example of hybrid warfare," *PISM Strategic File* no. 2 (110), February 2022.

2 M. Duszczyk and P. Kaczmarczyk, "The war in Ukraine and migration to Poland: Outlook and challenges," *Intereconomics* 57, no. 3 (2022).

3 The "simplified procedure" for employing a foreigner is an instrument based on declarations of entrusting work to a foreigner. It enables foreigners from specific countries to work in Poland for six months within the next twelve months without additional permits. Initially, this instrument was introduced in the agriculture sector in 2006 (followed by others in 2007) and later gradually developed further; for more, see A. Górny, P. Kaczmarczyk, M. Szulecka, M. Bitner, M. Okólski, U. Siedlecka, and A. Stefańczyk, "Immigrants in Poland in the context of a simplified procedure of employing foreigners," *WiseEuropa Report*, Warsaw, 2019.

4 Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, "War in Ukraine and migration to Poland."

5 M. Bukowski and M. Duszczyk, eds., "Hospitable Poland 2022+. How to wisely support Poland and Poles in helping people fleeing the war in Ukraine," *WiseEuropa*, p. 18.

6 Ibid.

7 "Law of 12 March 2022 on assistance to citizens of Ukraine in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of that country," *Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland*, no. 583.

8 "Report on cross-border mobility 'Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish labour market. New challenges and perspectives,'" 4th edition of the sociological study "Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish Labour Market" conducted by the Foundation for the Support of Migrants on the Labour Market EWL and the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, Warsaw, 2023, https://ewl.com.pl/en/report-on-cross-border-mobility-ukrainian-citizens-in-poland-and-on-the-polish-labour-market/.

9 Poland's twelve largest cities are Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów, Szczecin, Warsaw, and Wrocław; for more see S. Jarosz and W. Klaus, eds., "Polska szkoła pomagania. Przyjęcie osób uchodźczych z Ukrainy w Polsce w 2022 r.," *Konsorcjum Migracyjne*, Warsaw, 2023.

10 "Pomoc polskiego społeczeństwa dla uchodźców z Ukrainy," Polish Economic Institute Report, Warsaw, July 2022.

11 Jarosz and Klaus, "Polska szkoła pomagania."

12 "Law of 12 March 2022 on assistance to citizens of Ukraine."

13 *Konkurs—Wzajemnie Potrzebni*, https://wzajemniepotrzebni.pl/konkurs/.

14 "Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof," *Official Journal* L 212, 7 August 2001, p. 0012–0023.

15 "Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection," *Official Journal* L 71, 4 March 2022, p. 1.

16 "31 March 2023: 3.9 million with EU temporary protection," *Eurostat*, 8 May 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230508-1.

17 European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Welcoming those fleeing war in Ukraine: Readying Europe to meet the needs," Brussels, 23.3.2022 COM(2022) 131 final, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/ec-communication-welcoming-those-fleeing-war-ukraine-readying-europe-meet-needs_en.

18 See more at the European Commission website, Stand Up for Ukraine: Global campaign (europa.eu).

19 L. Asscher, "Integration of people fleeing Ukraine in the EU," Note to European Commission, May 2023.

20 Unemployment rates, EU and EA, seasonally adjusted, January 2008–August 2023, *Eurostat*, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Unemployment_statistics.

21 Narodowy Bank Polski, "Sytuacja życiowa i ekonomiczna migrantów z Ukrainy w Polsce – wpływ pandemii i wojny na charakter migracji w Polsce. Raport z badania ankietowego," Warsaw, March 2023.

22 "Report on cross-border mobility 'Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish labour market. New challenges and perspectives.'"

23 Narodowy Bank Polski, "Sytuacja życiowa i ekonomiczna migrantów z Ukrainy w Polsce."

24 "Report on cross-border mobility 'Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish labour market. New challenges and perspectives.'"

25 See József Hegedüs, Eszter Somogyi, Nóra Teller, and Adrienn Kiss, "Housing of Ukrainian refugees in Europe: Options for long-term solutions: Comparative study," FEANTSA, January 2023, https://www.habitat.org/sites/default/files/documents/Housing%20of%20Ukrainian%20Refugees%20in%20Europe.pdf.

26 Amnesty International, "'Ukraińcom nie chcą wynajmować.' Sytuacja mieszkaniowa uchodźców z Ukrainy w Polsce. Wyniki monitoringu Amnesty International," Warsaw, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org.pl/.

27 "Report on cross-border mobility 'Citizens of Ukraine on the Polish labour market. New challenges and perspectives.'"

28 Ibid.

29 For more, see A. Tymińska, "Analysis of the narratives about economy and privilege in 'anti-Ukrainian' discourses on the Polish-language Twitter. Quantitative and qualitative aspects," *Studia Politologiczne* 68, 2023.

30 Habitat for Humanity, "Long-term housing solutions for Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia," policy brief, February 2023, https://www.habitat.org/sites/default/files/documents/Policy%20Brief_Long%20term%20housing%20solutions%20for%20Ukrainian%20refugees_February%202023.pdf.

Jolanta Szymańska is the Head of the European Union Programme at the Polish Institute of International Affairs and an expert on EU migration policy. She holds a doctorate in Political Science (University of Warsaw, 2012) and was a lecturer at the University of Warsaw (2008–2020). She is the author of many publications on the political system of the European Union and EU migration policy.

HURI

UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY