# Beyond Borderland Conference: Panel 4 Summary ![bb_conference_icon.jpg](/sites/g/files/omnuum4931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__100x100_scale/public/huri/files/bb_conference_icon.jpg?itok=GRK2aipt) The 2022 TCUP Conference closed with a panel on Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policy priorities. Moderated by TCUP Director **Emily Channell-Justice**, the panel began by addressing the current Russian troop buildup and threats of further invasion of Ukraine’s territory. **Ambassador John Herbst** opened the conversation, arguing that the current developments indicate that Russia’s war in the Donbas has failed. Russia has failed to stop Ukraine from pursuing its interests in the west. However, he also pointed out the risks of any further invasion: Russian generals know that Ukraine will inflict casualties on Russian forces. The Russian people in general are not invested in this war, and they know it will be a disaster for Russia and for Putin. Herbst pointed out that the Biden administration has already responded strongly to Russian threats, and they could implement further devastating sanctions. They have already supplied more weapons to Ukraine and increased NATO forces in Eastern Europe. While Herbst felt the chances of a Russian invasion were less than 50%, he also stated that Ukraine’s Western allies are prepared for it. ![Panel poster with participants and their photos](/sites/g/files/omnuum4931/files/huri/files/tcup_bb_conference_-_panel_4_-_1000.jpg) **Alina Polyakova** agreed, though she argued that the probability of an invasion might be more than 50%, as has been indicated recently with Russian troop movements and signaling toward an invasion. Everything depends on how far Russia is willing to go and, and Polyakova believes the U.S. and Ukraine’s allies are doing the right thing by warning the world about what they are seeing on the ground. **Denis Gutenko** also supported Herbst’s comments, noting that Ukraine’s army is completely different than it was in 2014. At that time, it was much easier for Russia to invade. People have gotten used to the war after eight years, and they have been living with war for this time. At the same time, Gutenko noted that the extensive media coverage in foreign press has made people more cautious. Polyakova also agreed with Herbst that this is an indication that Russia has lost Ukraine completely. The initial occupation of Donbas served to mobilize and motivate Ukrainians to defend themselves. Now, Ukrainians do not see a return to the east—for their own security and for broader European security, they are turning to NATO and European integration. At the same time, Putin has made it clear that he will never let Ukraine go. He is willing to take on a potentially significant cost to keep Ukraine within Russia’s orbit by force. Ukraine is a missing piece in Russia’s version of the puzzle of what makes up the Russian World. And even if there is no invasion this time, it isn’t the last time we will be here—we have been in a mode of continuous crisis since 2014. **Oxana Shevel** argued that Putin’s aggression is counterproductive to his ultimate goal. Russia had a lot of leverage in Ukraine in the 1990s and 2000s, through its natural electoral geography, oligarchs, control of energy, and in the media. This influence did not disappear completely after Maidan, but now, there is a different set of attitudes. There is more support for Ukraine joining NATO, especially in the east and south. And unless Putin’s policies toward Ukraine change dramatically, it’s unlikely that pro-Russian attitudes will become prominent again. The panelists then addressed the question of whether or not Ukraine could reset its diplomatic relations with Russia now or in the future. Herbst stated that the choice is up to Ukraine—if they want to make peace with Russia, they are free to do so. But, he argued, Ukrainian attitudes were shifting away from Russia even during his time as ambassador in the 2000s, especially following the Orange Revolution. Russia, on its part, is pursuing a tsarist foreign policy. If Russia wants to remain a great power, it needs to give up these imperial ambitions, get rid of corruption, and free its people. This includes a shift to influence its neighbors by attraction and not coercion—in other words, it has to give up the policies we’re seeing play out in Ukraine. Gutenko added that Ukraine has already chosen its path, which are moving toward NATO and European integration. The government has developed ministries and policies to pursue this direction, which, in addition to connecting Ukraine to NATO and the EU, will also make life better within Ukraine. Polyakova reminded the audience that Putin gave a speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference where he laid out his vision for the world—we know what he is trying to achieve, but we have so far underestimated his willingness to lose lives and to take on the cost of it. Furthermore, Russian aggression is moving beyond its neighbors. Russian strategies of disinformation and cyberattacks go far beyond its near abroad. So far, there has been no signal that the Kremlin is looking for a diplomatic off-ramp from the current situation, or that they want better relations with Western countries and with Ukraine. And as long as Russia continues to occupy the Donbas and Crimea, it is difficult to see how there might be a diplomatic relationship between Ukraine and Russia. Shevel concurred, noting that the more aggressive Russia is, the more determined the Ukrainian elite will be not to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy that includes Russia; instead, they will turn decisively to the West. Shevel also reminded the audience that Ukraine was neutral in 2014 when Russia illegally annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbas, which happened in response to then-President Yanukovych’s intentions to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union (his turn away from that agreement resulted in the Euromaidan protests and Yanukovych’s removal from power). Since those protests ended, Ukraine has embarked on many domestic reforms, and panelists commented on what has been most successful. Herbst noted that banking sector reform has been the most lasting and, more recently, Ukraine preparing to join the European Union’s electricity grid. Gutenko provided an extensive overview of reforms, including the development of transparency mechanisms such as ProZorro for procurement and for selling state entities. Gutenko pointed to patrol police reform, as well as land sale reform, which now allows Ukrainians to sell agricultural land. He noted the developing health care reform, which is in progress and has several more stages. Education reform and pension reform, as well as the integration of administrative services through the Diia app were part of Gutenko’s assessment of reforms that are going in the right direction. However, Gutenko did recognize that there remains much to be done to ensure successful reforms, especially in the sphere of energy, anti-corruption reforms, and judicial sector reforms. Polyakova developed the issue of energy sector reforms, noting how far Ukraine has come in this area. She pointed to a deal between Germany and the U.S. in response to the development of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, in which Ukraine’s allies commit to establishing funds to help develop its energy sector and move toward green energy. Shevel took a different approach, asking how Ukraine can continue to remain a democracy in light of Russian aggression: in this context, it can be easy and even defensible to take measures that are not democratic. For instance, in the Constitutional Court, President Zelensky created new seats in a questionable manner, and he added judges who are his allies. Does this follow democratic standards? However, if Ukraine does not take these steps, then Russia can win because its influence in Ukraine would remain. As far as the question of what is preventing Ukraine from achieving these reforms, Herbst mentioned the lack of political will in Ukraine’s leadership, including the president. Further, oligarchs continue to play a role against reform in the country, but we must be cautious about the anti-oligarch law which, at this moment, might work to concentrate the media in the hands of the state by moving it out of oligarchs’ control. This would be a step backward. Gutenko also pointed out that the biggest issue in reforms is their implementation and putting the right people in the places where they can make the necessary changes. Polyakova advocated for the “sandwich” model that would encourage Ukraine to make reforms, which would include a combination of pressure from civil society from below and from the international community from above. Because pushing reforms through is not easy, tying international funding to specific reforms could be one way to ensure reforms are implemented. Shevel concluded that perhaps the best solution would be to open Ukraine to the European Union and frame Ukraine’s reform priorities in conditions for European integration. The audience’s questions focused largely on current Russian aggression and the potential for invasion. Herbst made clear that he is critical of how Russian negotiates, because the end result is typically Russia giving up nothing and other countries make concessions. So, he said, he has no interest in a settlement with Russia until we can see that Putin is serious about respecting Ukraine’s interests. Polyakova agreed, stating that it is frustrating to watch the U.S. and NATO member states reacting to the Kremlin’s agenda, as well as seeing EU and NATO members talk about European security as if it only involves members of those groups. Shevel took issue with Russian “gaslighting” in its narratives of the situation, particularly how they find ways to manipulate the story to portray themselves as a victim. Herbst left the audience with a more optimistic view of Ukraine’s NATO future, encouraging us to never say never. And he further echoed Shevel’s proposition to push Ukraine toward potential membership in the EU. Ukraine has a lot to offer NATO, said Shevel, including peacekeeping experience and a modernizing military. The panelists concluded that deterrence may work to keep Russia from invading Ukraine in the next days or weeks, but, as Herbst framed it, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” The conference closed with a discussion between Harvard Professor of Government and Russian Studies Timothy Colton and TCUP Director Emily Channell-Justice. They reiterated the importance of the concept of sovereignty in the modern world, and especially for Ukraine. The conference organizers would like to thank all the moderators, panelists, and audience participants for their engagement through the week. See also:- [ TCUP Commentary ](/page-type/tcup-commentary)